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Abstract		How	do	children	map	linguistic	representations	onto	the	conceptual	structures	that	they	encode?	In	the	present	studies,	we	provided	3-4	year	old	children	with	minimal-pair	scene	contrasts	in	order	to	determine	the	effect	of	particular	event	properties	on	novel	verb	learning.	Specifically,	we	tested	whether	spatiotemporal	cues	to	causation	also	inform	children’s	interpretation	of	transitive	verbs	either	with	or	without	the	causal/inchoative	alternation	(She	broke	the	lamp/the	lamp	broke).	In	Experiment	1,	we	examined	spatiotemporal	continuity.	Children	saw	scenes	with	puppets	that	approached	a	toy	in	a	distinctive	manner,	and	toys	that	lit	up	or	played	a	sound.	In	the	causal	events,	the	puppet	contacted	the	object,	and	activation	was	immediate.	In	the	noncausal	events,	the	puppet	stopped	short	before	reaching	the	object,	and	the	effect	occurred	after	a	short	pause	(apparently	spontaneously).	Children	expected	novel	verbs	used	in	the	inchoative	transitive/intransitive	alternation	to	refer	to	spatiotemporally	intact	causal	interactions	rather	than	to	'gap'	control	scenes.	In	Experiment	2,	we	manipulated	the	temporal	order	of	sub-events,	holding	spatial	relationships	constant,	and	provided	evidence	for	only	one	verb	frame	(either	transitive	or	intransitive).	Children	mapped	transitive	verbs	to	scenes	where	the	agent's	action	closely	preceded	the	activation	of	the	toy	over	scenes	in	which	the	timing	of	the	two	events	was	switched,	but	did	not	do	so	when	they	heard	an	intransitive	construction.	These	studies	reveal	that	children’s	expectations	about	transitive	verbs	are	at	least	partly	driven	by	their	nonlinguistic	understanding	of	causal	events:	children	expect	transitive	syntax	to	refer	to	scenes	where	the	agent's	action	is	a	plausible	cause	of	the	outcome.	These	findings	open	a	wide	avenue	for	exploration	into	the	relationship	between	children’s	linguistic	knowledge	and	their	nonlinguistic	understanding	of	events.		
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Linking	Language	and	Events:	Spatiotemporal	cues	drive	children’s	expectations	
about	the	meanings	of	novel	transitive	verbs	
	 During	their	first	years	of	life,	children	develop	rich	and	robust	cognitive	models	of	the	world	around	them.	They	represent	the	differences	between	people	and	objects,	make	predictions	about	physical	and	social	events,	and	learn	complex	patterns	of	causal	information	(	Baker,	Saxe,	&	Tenenbaum,	2011;	Luo,	Kaufman,	&	Baillargeon,	2009;	Sobel,	Tenenbaum,	&	Gopnik,	2004;	Spelke,	1990;	Woodward,	1998).	At	the	same	time,	they	learn	the	structure	and	content	of	at	least	one	language,	acquiring	representations	that	allow	them	to	understand	the	speech	around	them	and	produce	novel	sentences	of	their	own.	Relatively	little	is	known	about	how	children	map	these	linguistic	representations	onto	the	conceptual	structures	that	they	encode.		A	central	property	of	human	language	is	that	there	are	systematic	correspondences	between	the	form	of	sentence	(syntax)	and	its	meaning	(semantics)	(Baker,	1988;	Brown,	1958;	Fillmore,	1968;	Montague,	1970;	Pinker,	1984).	For	instance,	although	there	are	no	familiar	content	words	in	the	sentence	The	blicket	daxed	the	wug	to	the	blorg,	adults	can	infer	that	the	event	involved	transfer	and	that	dax	means	something	kind	of	like	give	(Gilette,	Gleitman,	Gleitman,	&	Lederer,	1999;	Kako,	2006;	Snedeker	&	Gleitman,	2004).	Linguistic	studies,	within	and	across	languages,	have	revealed	a	rich	set	of	connections	between	semantics	and	syntax	that	are	captured	in	the	argument	structures	of	verbs	(cf.	Levin	&	Rappaport	Hovav,	2005	for	a	review),	the	organized	dimensions	of	meaning	that	influence	how	verbs	will	appear	in	sentences.	These	correspondences	raise	several	questions	about	how	event	representations	and	linguistic	forms	interact	during	
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development.	What	do	young	children	learn	about	events	from	the	syntax	of	sentences	describing	them?	And	critically,	do	children’s	expectations	about	the	meanings	of	verbs	follow	or	depart	from	their	intuitions	about	nonlinguistic	concepts?	In	the	present	studies,	we	provide	children	with	minimal-pair	event	contrasts	in	order	to	explore	a	specific	feature,	causation,	which	may	guide	young	children’s	expectations	about	transitive	sentences	like	Sarah	broke	the	lamp.	Studies	of	causal	perception	have	found	that	the	spatiotemporal	relationships	between	events	are	a	critical	cue	to	causation.	Here,	we	examine	whether	these	same	spatiotemporal	cues	also	inform	children’s	interpretation	of	transitive	verbs.		There	is	rich	body	of	evidence	showing	that	basic	spatial	and	temporal	cues	play	a	critical	role	in	distinguishing	a	causal	event	from	a	noncausal	one	(Leslie	&	Keeble,	1987;	Leslie,	1984;	Michotte,	1963;	Muentener	&	Carey,	2010).	This	kind	of	causal	perception	has	primarily	been	studied	using	simple	motion	events	with	two	sub-events	(e.g.,	one	billiard	ball	rolling,	and	then	another	one	rolling).	Critically,	the	perception	of	causality	depends	on	the	spatiotemporal	relationship	between	these	two	sub-events.	If	the	second	ball	pauses	before	moving	away,	or	if	the	first	ball	does	not	make	contact	with	the	second	before	it	starts	moving,	adults	do	not	perceive	a	causal	relationship	(Michotte,	1963).	Figure	1	illustrates	an	example	of	this	distinction:	both	diagrams	show	two	sub-events:	a	dark	gray	ball	rolling	and	a	light	gray	ball	rolling.	In	(a),	these	motions	are	contiguous:	the	balls	make	contact	and	the	light	gray	begins	to	move	as	soon	as	the	dark	gray	ball	reaches	it.	In	a	moving	version,	even	though	we	know	it	is	in	fact	a	two-dimensional	animation,	we	clearly	perceive	the	first	ball	bumping	into	the	second	and	making	it	roll.	In	(b),	the	motions	are	
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not	contiguous:	the	first	ball	stops	before	reaching	the	second,	and	there	is	a	delay	before	the	second	begins	moving,	apparently	self-propelled.		[INSERT	FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE]	Infant	causal	perception	appears	to	be	guided	by	the	same	constraints.	For	example,	when	6	month	olds	see	an	intact	causal	event,	they	dishabituate	strongly	to	a	new	event	where	the	first	ball	(the	causal	agent)	changes	(Leslie	&	Keeble,	1987).	In	contrast,	if	they	see	an	event	with	a	spatiotemporal	gap	like	(b),	they	are	less	impressed	by	changes	in	the	first	ball.	The	fact	that	very	young	children	use	this	kind	of	fine-grained	spatiotemporal	information	to	understand	causal	events	indicates	that	they	are	sensitive	to	the	sub-event	
structure	of	these	events.	They	do	not	group	all	two-participant	‘billiard-ball’	scenes	together	or	treat	each	sub-event	as	a	separate	entity.	Instead	they	recognize	that	the	relationship	between	the	motion	of	the	first	and	the	motion	of	the	second	ball	carries	crucial	information	about	the	event	as	a	whole.		Understanding	how	children	map	between	these	causal	concepts	and	language	is	critical	for	two	reasons.	First,	causal	concepts	underlie	some	of	the	central	generalizations	about	the	form	and	interpretation	of	language.	Causal	information	is	carried	not	only	by	particular	words	in	a	language	(such	as	make	or	because)	but	also	by	the	form	of	a	sentence.	A	sequence	like	"Ben	pilked	the	cup.	The	cup	pilked."	suggests	to	adult	participants	that	pilking	involves	changing	or	causally	affecting	the	cup	in	some	way,	even	through	the	actual	verb	is	unfamiliar	(Kako,	2006).	In	lexical	semantics,	this	fact	is	captured	by	theories	of	verb	meaning	which	encode	causation	as	a	representational	primitive,	as	in:	(1)	 a.	The	box	opened	b.	[BECOME	[Y	open]]	
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(2)	 a.	John	opened	the	box	b.	[X	CAUSE	[BECOME	[Y	open]]]	(c.f.	Jackendoff,	1983)	While	there	are	a	variety	of	proposals	about	lexical	semantics	that	differ	in	many	respects,	most	of	these	theories	break	the	meanings	of	verbs	into	pieces	(subpredicates)	and	include	a	subpredicate	that	encodes	cause	(Croft,	2012;	Fillmore,	1968;	Folli	&	Harley,	2008;	Hale	&	Keysar,	1993;	Jackendoff,	1990;	Pinker,	1989;	Rappaport	Hovav	&	Levin,	1998;	Talmy,	1988;	Van	Valin	&	LaPolla,	1997).	If	they	are	available	to	children,	these	argument	structures	could	provide	a	constrained	set	of	hypotheses	for	learning	a	new	verb.	As	shown	above,	these	structures	dictate	the	number	of	arguments	expressed	about	an	event	and	the	hierarchical	relationships	between	them,	and	these	relationships	are	reflected	in	the	syntax	of	sentences.	Thus,	when	running,	chasing,	playing,	and	laughing	are	all	going	on	in	a	scene,	the	sentence	surrounding	a	new	verb	can	provide	important	information	about	the	number	of	participants	and	the	nature	of	their	relation,	that	can	allow	the	child	determine	which	specific	perspective	on	an	event	is	being	referred	to.	The	second	motivation	for	understanding	how	causation	maps	to	language	is	that	children	acquire	much	of	their	causal	knowledge	about	the	world	through	language.	Second-hand	information	provided	by	adults	or	peers	(Harris,	2002;	Harris	&	Koenig	2006)	can	change	children’s	understanding	of	causal	events	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Children	categorize	objects	differently	when	causal	language	is	used	to	describe	them	(Nazzi	&	Gopnik,	2000,	2001),	preschoolers	explore	perceptually	identical	objects	with	disparate	causal	properties	more	if	the	objects	are	given	the	same	name	(Schulz,	Standing,	&	Bonawitz,	2008),	and	2-year	olds	who	have	learned	that	one	event	predicts	another	only	try	themselves	to	use	the	first	action	to	cause	the	second	if	the	relationship	has	been	described	
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with	causal	language	like	‘the	block	makes	the	helicopter	spin’	(Bonawitz	et	al.,	2010).	However,	little	is	known	about	how	children	use	specific	grammatical	or	semantic	features	of	the	language	they	hear	to	support	causal	learning.		Transitive	sentences	like	Sarah	broke	the	lamp	are	thus	a	critical	test	case	for	understanding	how	children	connect	specific	linguistic	information	–	in	this	case	argument	structure	–	to	their	nonlinguistic	conceptual	representations.	Because	causal	events	are	just	one	kind	of	two-participant	event,	the	number	of	arguments	in	the	sentence	does	not	in	itself	provide	strong	evidence	that	sentence	describes	a	causal	event.	This	parallels	the	effect	in	causal	perception:	the	number	of	billiard	balls	in	a	display	does	not	provide	strong	evidence	on	its	own	that	the	event	is	causal.	However,	both	within	and	across	languages	(Haspelmath,	1993;	Levin	&	Rappaport	Hovav,	2005),	causal	events	are	more	likely	than	noncausal	events	to	be	described	in	a	transitive	sentence	(3)	rather	than	a	sentence	like	(4),	where	an	intransitive	verb	appears	with	a	prepositional	phrase.	(3)	John	broke	the	vase.	(4)	John	talked	to	Bill.	English	learners	face	a	challenge,	though,	because	the	connection	between	transitivity	and	cause	is	in	actuality	fairly	weak.	Transitives	are	also	used	to	describe	contact	(the	lamp	
touches	the	table),	perception	(the	girl	sees	the	lion),	spatial	relations	(the	wall	surrounds	
the	castle),	and	motion	(the	tiger	enters	the	room),	all	of	which	lack	cause	predicates	in	argument	structure	theories	(cf.	Levin	&	Rappaport	Hovav,	2005).	When	we	look	across	languages,	however,	the	picture	is	clearer:	events	of	direct	external	causation	are	consistently	described	with	transitives,	whereas	the	encoding	of	noncausal	events	is	more	variable.	For	instance,	the	Russian	translations	of	sentences	like	‘The	supervisor	manages	
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the	department’	are	not	transitive	sentences	but	instead	have	oblique	arguments	(roughly,	‘The	supervisor	manages	over	the	department’;	Levin	&	Rappaport	Hovav,	2005).	This	connection	between	cause	and	transitivity	influences	the	behavior	of	adult	English	speakers,	despite	the	looseness	with	which	English	uses	transitive	syntax.	When	adult	English	speakers	are	asked	to	guess	the	meanings	of	novel	transitive	verbs,	they	interpret	them	as	causal	verbs,	inferring	that	the	subject	exerted	force	and	caused	something	to	move	or	change,	while	the	object	underwent	some	change	of	state	(Kako,	2006).	This	is	true	even	in	the	absence	of	the	causal/inchoative	alternation	(The	girl	breaks	the	lamp/The	lamp	breaks),	which	is	more	tightly	limited	to	causal	meanings.	The	fact	that	the	same	surface	syntax	allows	both	causal	verbs	like	break	and	noncausal	verbs	like	touch	presents	an	important	learning	challenge	for	young	children.	Children	will	hear	transitive	verbs	with	a	variety	of	meanings:	some	verbs	will	encode	cause	and	effect,	but	others	will	encode	contact,	perception,	or	possession.	The	more	specific	causal/inchoative	alternation	might	help,	but	especially	with	less	frequent	verbs	children	may	not	reliably	hear	both	versions	of	an	alternation	used	with	a	single	event.	Thus	the	evidence	that	children	receive	from	linguistic	input	may	be	broadly	consistent	with	(at	least)	two	hypotheses.	First,	the	transitive	frame	could	have	a	single	and	fairly	general	meaning.	In	particular,	transitive	syntax	could	be	seen	as	applicable	to	any	event	that	involves	two	participant	roles,	with	any	ranked	preferences	reflecting	the	cues	children	use	to	determine	what	counts	as	a	‘two	participant	event’.	This	single	mapping	would	cover	not	only	causal	transitives	but	also	those	encoding	contact,	perception,	motion,	and	spatial	relationships.	In	fact,	Fisher	and	colleagues	have	suggested	that	infants	might	begin	verb	learning	with	precisely	this	kind	of	broad	mapping	and	only	later	develop	
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more	specific	intuitions	(Fisher,	Gertner,	Scott,	&	Yuan,	2010;	Fisher,	1996;	Lidz,	Gleitman,	&	Gleitman,	2003;	Yuan,	Fisher,	&	Snedeker,	2012).	Second,	children	could	believe	(in	addition	to	or	instead	of	a	general	two-participant	preference)	that	the	transitive	frame	has	multiple	meaning	‘clusters’,	each	of	which	encodes	a	different	specific	event	structure.	On	this	hypothesis,	we	might	expect	a	mapping	between	transitive	syntax	and	causation	to	be	acquired	earlier	than	many	of	the	others,	both	because	it	relies	on	concepts	that	are	available	early	in	infancy	and	because	it	is	cross-linguistically	robust	(raising	possibility	that	it	serves	central	role	in	the	organization	of	argument	structure).		The	existing	research	on	verb	learning	in	young	children	is	compatible	with	both	of	these	possibilities.	Four	sets	of	findings	are	particularly	relevant.	First,	children	interpret	transitive	verbs	as	referring	to	prototypical	causal	events	(e.g.,	one	girl	spinning	another	girl	on	a	chair)	rather	than	events	with	parallel	action	(e.g.,	two	girls	jogging)	or	a	single	participant	(Arunachalam,	Escovar,	Hansen,	&	Waxman,	2013;	Arunachalam	&	Waxman,	2010;	Naigles,	1990;	Yuan	&	Fisher,	2009;	Yuan	et	al.,	2012).	This	finding	has	been	extensively	replicated	across	a	variety	of	ages	and	discourse	conditions	(cf.	Fisher,	Gertner,	Scott,	&	Yuan,	2010	for	a	review).	Second,	children	also	interpret	transitive	verbs	as	referring	to	prototypical	contact	events	(e.g.,	a	girl	patting	another	girl	on	the	head)	rather	than	events	with	parallel	actions	(Naigles	&	Kako,	1993).	Third,	under	some	circumstances,	children	prefer	to	interpret	transitive	verbs	as	referring	prototypical	causal	events	rather	than	prototypical	contact	events	(Naigles	1996;	Scott	&	Fisher,	2009).	Finally,	children	prefer	transitive	verbs	to	refer	to	telic	events	(roughly,	events	that	are	‘finished’	to	a	natural	boundary	point)	rather	than	atelic	ones,	even	in	the	absence	of	causality	(Hohenstein,	Naigles	&	Eisenberg	2004;	Wagner	2010).	
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This	research	is	consistent	with	both	the	possibility	that	children	have	only	a	single	broad	semantic	mapping	(‘two	participants’)	for	the	transitive	and	the	possibility	that	they	make	additional	narrow,	specific	semantic	mappings.	Under	the	‘two	participant’	account,	it	suggests	that	causal,	contact,	and	telic	events	qualify	as	a	single	event	with	two	participants,	but	that	parallel-action	and	atelic	motion	scenes	do	not.	The	only	preference	established	within	two-participant	scenes	is	cause>contact,	and	this	might	be	because	the	participant	roles	in	a	causal	event	are	somewhat	more	asymmetric	than	the	participants	in	a	contact	event,	making	them	a	somewhat	better	candidate	for	the	transitive	frame.	Likewise,	in	a	telic	motion	event	(a	girl	enters	a	room),	the	two	arguments	(girl,	room)	might	be	more	naturally	understood	as	two	participants	in	a	single	event	than	in	an	atelic	version	(a	girl	runs	around	inside	a	room.)	The	main	challenge	for	this	kind	of	theory	is	to	explain	how	children	classify	an	event	as	having	two	participants	of	the	right	kind.	Under	the	second	‘clustering’	hypothesis,	the	findings	suggest	that	young	children	have	mapped	the	transitive	construction	to	both	cause	and	contact	meanings,	but	may	prefer	the	causal	mapping	to	the	contact	one;	additionally,	they	may	map	the	transitive	to	a	broader	but	overlapping	class	of	telic	events.	The	equivalent	challenge	for	this	theory	is	then	to	explain	how	children	form	(and	rank)	these	more	specific	mapping	expectations.	How	can	we	determine	when	and	whether	children	form	specific	mappings	between	transitive	syntax	and	specific	event	classes	such	as	causation?	To	do	this,	it	is	necessary	to	test	the	boundaries	of	an	event	class	of	interest,	in	addition	to	prototypical	exemplars.	Critically,	because	the	studies	described	above	have	used	prototypically	events	of	cause,	contact,	and	so	on,	they	do	not	demonstrate	that	it	is	the	causal	properties	of	an	event	per	
se	that	lead	children	to	the	transitive	mapping.	These	studies	were	largely	designed	to	
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explore	verb	learning	and	the	nature	of	early	syntactic	representations,	and	consequently	the	stimuli	were	often	not	designed	to	control	for	and	target	small	conceptual	distinctions.		This	method	of	pitting	two	event	prototypes	against	each	other	originates	with	Naigles	(1990).	In	this	study,	children	saw	two	test	scenes:	one	canonically	causal	scene	in	which	a	duck	pushing	on	a	bunny’s	shoulders	to	make	it	bend	over,	and	one	‘parallel	action’	scene	in	which	the	duck	and	bunny	simultaneously	and	separately	wave	their	arms.	2-year-olds	mapped	transitive,	but	not	intransitive,	novel	verbs	to	the	causal	scene	(Naigles,	1990).	What	features	of	these	events	guided	toddlers’	syntax-specific	expectations?	Children	might	be	tuning	in	to	many	different	features	of	the	scene,	such	as	a	particular	forceful	action,	the	timing	of	the	duck’s	shoulder-pushing	and	the	bunny’s	bending,	or	the	simple	fact	that	the	actions	performed	by	the	duck	and	bunny	are	different	from	one	another.	In	other	words,	the	causal	scene	is	characterized	both	by	particular	sub-events	(shoulder-pushing),	and	by	a	particular	relationship	between	sub-events	(the	difference,	characteristic	timing,	and/or	physical	proximity	of	the	duck	and	bunny’s	sub-events.)		Thus,	the	existing	studies	of	children’s	early	syntactic	awareness	do	not	tell	us	whether	children	selectively	expect	transitive	verbs	to	refer	to	causal	events,	qua	causal	events.	In	these	studies,	we	therefore	investigate	whether	preschoolers'	expectations	about	novel	transitive	sentences	are	sensitive	to	spatiotemporal	cues	to	causality.	To	do	this,	we	provide	children	with	minimal-pair	scene	contrasts	to	determine	the	effect	of	specific	event	properties	on	novel	verb	learning.	We	test	these	questions	with	3-	and	4-year-olds,	who	have	rich	representations	of	causality	in	nonlinguistic	domains	and	who	are	actively	building	their	verb	lexicons.	In	Experiment	1,	we	provided	children	with	novel	verbs	in	the	more	specific	causal/inchoative	alternation	(The	toy	pilked,	she	pilked	the	toy)	and	
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examined	spatiotemporal	continuity.	All	stimuli	consisted	of	a	puppet	who	approached	a	toy	in	a	distinctive	manner	(sub-event	A),	and	a	toy	that	lit	up	or	played	a	sound	(sub-event	B).	In	the	causal	versions	of	each	event,	the	puppet	contacted	the	object,	and	activation	was	immediate.	The	noncausal	event	versions	were	identical	except	that	the	puppet	stopped	short	before	reaching	the	object,	and	the	effect	occurred	after	a	short	pause	(paralleling	the	noncausal	interaction	shown	in	Figure	1(b)).	Because	the	resulting	percepts	can	be	difficult	to	visualize	from	still	pictures,	all	of	our	event	stimuli	are	also	available	for	view	online	at	the	Open	Science	Framework,	https://osf.io/u6s79/.	Children	viewed	both	events,	heard	a	sentence	with	a	novel	verb,	and	had	to	choose	one	of	the	two	alternate	scenes.	Because	this	kind	of	‘gap’	contrast	necessarily	adds	more	time	to	the	noncausal	control	versions,	we	are	sensitive	to	the	fact	that	this	could	also	be	interpreted	as	a	manipulation	that	made	those	movies	seem	less	like	a	single	two-participant	event.	In	Experiment	2,	we	therefore	made	
	(a)					
		(b)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Figure	1:	Adults	readily	perceive	(a)	as	direct	launching,	a	causal	event.	Sequence	(b)	is	perceived	as	noncausal:	the	light	gray	ball	appears	to	move	on	its	own	(Michotte,	1963).	Only	the	spatiotemporal	relationship	between	the	two	sub-events	(dark	gray	ball	moves,	light	gray	ball	moves)	differs	between	scenes.	
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two	changes,	giving	children	evidence	for	only	one	syntactic	frame	(i.e.	transitive	without	the	intransitive	alternation)	and	examining	a	different	spatiotemporal	cue,	namely	temporal	order.	In	these	stimuli,	an	actor	approached	or	gestured	at	an	object	(sub-event	A);	the	object	immediately	lit	up	or	moved	(sub-event	B.)	In	the	noncausal	version	of	each	stimulus,	the	events	were	identical	except	that	the	actor	initiated	her	movement	immediately	after	the	toy	activated.	In	both	experiments,	each	novel	event	pair	was	identical	except	for	the	critical	causal	perception	cue	Thus	they	were	equated	for	overall	levels	of	activity,	participant	asymmetry,	telicity,	and	most	other	factors	which	might	reasonably	identify	a	scene	as	member	of	a	broad	‘two	participant’	category.	The	two	hypotheses	about	children’s	initial	expectations	about	event-to-verb	mappings	thus	make	very	different	predictions.	If	children	map	transitive	sentences	specifically	to	causal	scenes	(perhaps	alongside	other	mappings)	then	after	hearing	novel	transitive	verbs,	they	should	choose	the	event	with	spatiotemporal	cues	consistent	with	causal	relationships.	Under	the	theory	that	children	use	more	holistic	information	about	the	number	of	participants	in	the	target	event,	we	might	expect	children	to	show	no	preferences	between	the	two	event	variants.		
2.	Experiment	1	Experiment	1	is	the	first	study	to	investigate	how	children’s	expectations	about	the	meaning	of	a	transitive	verb	are	affected	when	only	a	single	aspect	of	the	event	structure,	spatiotemporal	contiguity,	is	varied.	All	events	in	this	study	consisted	of	scenes	containing	two	sub-events:	an	action	performed	by	an	animate	entity	(a	female	puppet),	and	an	outcome	effect	in	a	novel	toy	(e.g.	lighting	up,	spinning	around.)	Children	were	presented	with	minimal	pair	contrasts,	identical	to	each	other	save	for	the	spatiotemporal	
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relationship	between	the	sub-events.	In	the	‘continuous’	(causal)	scenes	(see	Figure	2	and	the	online	repository),	the	puppet	approached	and	made	contact	with	the	toy,	and	the	effect	took	place	immediately.	In	the	‘gap’	contrasts,	the	puppet	approached	the	toy	but	stopped	several	inches	away	from	it;	after	a	short	pause	the	toy	activated,	apparently	spontaneously.	Both	movies	were	initially	described	with	an	intransitive	frame	(Look,	it’s	
wugging!),	and	then	in	the	transitive	during	the	critical	test	questions	(Can	you	find	where	
she	wugged	the	round	thing),	thus	providing	the	causal/inchoative	alternation	for	the	novel	verb.	To	control	for	the	possibility	that	children	might	select	the	causal	events	simply	because	they	were	more	interesting	than	the	noncausal	events,	all	children	were	asked	in	a	counterbalanced	order	to	identify	scenes	in	which	the	puppet	wugged	the	round	thing	and	
didn’t	wug	the	round	thing.		Previous	research	has	already	established	that	infants	use	spatial	contact	and	contingent	timing	between	an	action	and	an	outcome	to	detect	causal	and	noncausal	
	Figure	2:	Schematic	of	the	event	contrasts	used	in	Experiment	1.	Each	novel	event	was	filmed	in	a	causal	version	and	a	“gap”	control	introducing	a	spatial	gap	and	short	pause	between	the	agent’s	action	and	the	toy’s	outcome.		
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events.	What	is	at	issue	here	is	whether	this	distinction	is	also	relevant	to	how	children	interpret	the	meaning	of	transitive	constructions.	If	children	expect	transitive	sentences	to	refer	to	causal	scenes	in	particular,	then	when	they	hear	transitive	sentences	like	Sarah	
wugged	the	round	thing,	they	should	choose	the	continuous	(causal)	scenes	over	the	(noncausal)	gap	variants.	On	the	other	hand,	if	children	are	sensitive	only	to	coarser	scene	features	such	as	the	active	presence	of	two	participants,	then	children	might	choose	between	the	events	randomly.	In	particular,	since	the	content	of	each	of	the	two	individual	sub-events	(puppet	wiggling,	globe	spinning)	is	identical	between	event	versions,	children	cannot	depend	on	particular	features	of	the	entities	or	the	sub-events	(e.g.	a	particular	intentional	motion	by	the	puppet,	or	a	particular	kind	of	toy	effect)	to	guide	verb	preferences.	Any	preferences	that	children	show	in	this	task	must	therefore	be	due	to	the	differing	spatiotemporal	relationship	(i.e.	contact	and	timing)	between	the	sub-events.	
2.1	Method	
2.1.1	Participants:	Preschoolers	were	recruited	from	a	local	children’s	museum	(n=24	mean	age:	3;11,	range	3;0-4;9,	12	girls).	Participants	were	replaced	if	they	were	unable	to	reach	criteria	on	the	pretest	training	(n=3.)	Five	additional	children	were	replaced	due	to	refusal	to	point	at	the	movies	or	parental	interference.	All	children	received	a	sticker	and	award	certificate	for	their	participation	at	the	end	of	the	session.	
2.1.2	Materials:	Gap	and	continuous	video	versions	were	created	for	six	novel	events.	All	events	were	initiated	by	a	female	puppet	held	by	the	experimenter.	In	each	continuous	event,	the	puppet	contacted	a	novel	apparatus	that	immediately	moved,	lit	up,	or	made	noise.	The	‘gap’	version	of	each	event	differed	only	in	the	spatiotemporal	relationship	between	action	and	outcome	sub-events,	with	a	roughly	10-15	cm	gap	and	1-
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second	pause	between	the	puppet’s	final	position	and	the	activating	toy.	In	all	videos,	the	event	was	played	through	three	times,	ending	on	a	still	shot	showing	the	result	and	the	final	position	of	the	puppet.	Videos	varied	between	4.5	and	8	seconds	in	total	length,	with	no	more	than	a	1	second	length	difference	between	the	causal	and	noncausal	version	of	the	same	event.	Descriptions	of	the	events	are	shown	in	Table	1.	Video	stimuli	were	presented	on	a	17-inch	laptop,	using	the	Psychtoolbox	extensions	of	Matlab	(Brainard,	1997).	An	additional	apparatus	was	used	during	the	introduction,	consisting	of	an	open-backed	box	with	a	toy	helicopter	on	top	that	could	be	covertly	activated.	
2.1.3	Procedure:	Each	session	consisted	of	an	introduction,	a	pretest	and	the	main	
	Event		 Agent’s	action	 Outcome	effect	(1)	 Puppet	hops	over	to	land	on	green	squeaky	toy	 Toy	squeaks	(2)	 Puppet	places	ball	on	ramp,	which	rolls	down	to	plastic	donut	 Plastic	donut	“boings”	(3)	 Puppet	bends	over	and	places	her	head	on	box	 Wand	on	top	of	box	lights	up	and	blinks	(4)	 Puppet	pushes	balanced	pendulum	 Pendulum	tips	over	and	swings	(5)	 Puppet	wiggles	down	to	globe	 Globe	lights	up	and	spins	around	(6)	 Puppet	slides	over	to	window	shade	 Window	shade	pops	up		Table	1:	Novel	events	used	for	training	(events	1-2)	and	verb-learning	trials	in	Experiment	1.	Causal	and	non-causal	versions	were	created	by	varying	the	final	position	of	the	puppet	and	the	relative	timing	of	the	two	sub-events.		
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novel	verb	test.	During	the	introduction,	children	were	introduced	to	‘my	friend	Sarah’,	a	puppet	who	liked	to	say	silly	words.	The	experimenter	showed	them	the	helicopter	apparatus,	demonstrating	that	Sometimes,	Sarah	puts	her	hand	here	[on	top	of	the	box]	and	
makes	it	go...But	sometimes,	it	just	happens	on	its	own,	because	there’s	a	battery	inside.	Children	were	then	prompted	to	activate	the	toy,	and	shown	again	that	it	could	activate	spontaneously.	Then	the	experimenter	prepared	children	for	the	rest	of	the	session	by	explaining	that	in	the	movies	they	would	see,	Sometimes,	Sarah	makes	something	happen.	
Like	this,	when	they’re	touching.	And	sometimes	they	don’t	touch	and	it	just	happens	on	its	
own,	because	there’s	a	battery	inside.	This	pre-training	sequence	was	included	because	pilot	testing	indicated	that	without	this	training,	children	were	unable	to	answer	questions	about	the	causality	of	the	movie	stimuli	described	below.	This	may	have	been	due	to	the	fact	that,	unlike	infant	causal	studies	(cf.	Figure	1)	our	displays	were	complex,	featuring	multiple	interesting	objects	and	novel	actions	including	toys	that	could	activate	both	spontaneously	and	in	response	to	an	agent’s	action.	Understanding	the	structure	of	the	scenes	is	a	critical	precondition	for	interpreting	children’s	responses	to	novel	verb	sentences.	That	is,	if	children	are	unable	to	find	the	causal	movie	quickly	enough,	they	cannot	possibly	use	that	causal	information	to	determine	the	meaning	of	a	transitive	verb.	This	training	may	thus	have	focused	children’s	overall	attention	on	causal	events	over	other	types	of	events,	but	it	did	not	provide	the	critical	link	to	linguistic	transitivity.	To	further	ensure	this,	during	training	children	never	heard	causal	(or	noncausal)	events	described	with	transitive	sentences	such	as	Sarah’s	touching	the	box.	Following	this	introduction,	children	moved	to	the	video	presentation,	beginning	with	two	pretest	trials	using	the	first	two	events	(see	Table	1).	The	pretest	was	designed	to	
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train	children	on	the	forced-choice	task	and	determine	whether	they	understood	the	events	they	were	seeing.	During	the	pretest	trials,	children	viewed	both	the	gap	and	continuous	version	of	one	of	the	novel	events,	with	version	and	side	presentation	counterbalanced	between	children.	During	these	videos,	children	heard	neutral	language	directing	their	attention	to	the	video	(Look	over	here!	Whoa,	look	at	that!).	For	each	video,	the	experimenter	pointed	at	the	patient	object,	and	asked	the	children	Are	Sarah	and	that	thing	
touching?	So,	did	Sarah	make	that	happen	or	did	it	just	happen	on	its	own?	After	seeing	both	versions,	children	made	two	forced-choice	decisions,	identifying:	1)	where	Sarah	and	the	object	were	touching,	and	2)	where	Sarah	made	the	event	happen.	Positive	and	negative	versions	(i.e.	where	Sarah	didn’t	touch	the	toy)	of	these	questions	were	counterbalanced.	The	pretest	procedure	was	then	repeated	with	the	second	novel	event.	Children	who	could	not	provide	correct	answers	to	3	out	of	the	4	total	forced-choice	questions	in	the	pretest	were	not	included	in	the	analysis.	Three	children	were	replaced	for	this	reason.		For	the	critical	novel	verb	test,	children	saw	a	trial	for	each	of	the	four	remaining	novel	events.	In	each	trial,	children	saw	the	continuous	(causal)	version	of	the	event	on	one	side	of	the	screen,	and	the	gap	(noncausal)	version	on	the	other.	The	trial	order,	as	well	as	version	and	side	presentation	for	each	trial,	was	randomized	for	each	child.	On	each	trial	children	saw	the	two	contrasting	movies	in	sequence,	with	the	same	voice-over	for	both.	The	voiceover	used	the	target	novel	verb	in	intransitive	sentences:	
Look	over	here!	The	tall	thing	is	wugging,	it’s	wugging.	Whoa!	Watch	one	more	time,	
it’s	gonna	wug...Wow!		Children	were	then	reminded	that	In	one	movie	Sarah	made	it	happen,	and	in	one	movie	she	
didn’t.	They	saw	each	event	a	final	time,	and	then	the	final	freeze-frames	for	both	movies	
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were	presented.	Children	heard	two	test	prompts	(Positive-	Can	you	find	the	movie	where	
she	wugged	the	round	thing?;	Negative	-	Can	you	find	the	movie	where	she	didn’t	wug	the	
round	thing?)	with	order	randomized	across	trials.	The	experimenter	waited	until	the	child	pointed	to	a	movie;	no	additional	verb	prompts	were	given,	but	children	were	invited	to	‘pick	just	one	movie’	if	they	hesitated	to	choose.	Children	very	occasionally	pointed	to	both	movies,	sometimes	appearing	to	change	their	mind	and	sometimes	appearing	to	indicate	both	movies;	in	all	cases,	children’s	first	clear	point	to	a	movie	was	coded	as	their	answer.	As	a	manipulation	check	children	were	then	asked	to	identify	the	movie	where	they’re	
touching.	
2.2	Results	All	results	and	analyses	for	Experiment	1	are	available	on	the	Open	Science	Framework	at	http://osf.io/u6s79/.	The	dependent	measure	of	interest	was	how	often	children	chose	gap	or	continuous	versions	(i.e.	spatiotemporal	continuity	disrupted	or	preserved)	of	each	event	following	different	prompts.	We	predicted	that	children	would	choose	the	continuous	version	of	events	when	asked	to	find	the	movie	where	the	puppet	and	toy	were	touching,	and	when	given	positive	transitive	prompts	(e.g.	Where	she	wugged	the	round	thing).	Note	that	this	sentence	suggests	a	causal	referent	only	if	children	already	expect	transitive	sentences	to	refer	to	this	kind	of	scene.		Children’s	performance	was	converted	to	a	score	between	0	and	4,	reflecting	the	number	of	trials	on	which	they	chose	the	continuous	(causal)	scene.	Figure	3	plots	children’s	responses	to	the	three	prompt	types	in	Experiment	1.	The	manipulation	check	confirmed	that	children	were	successfully	identifying	the	scenes	where	the	puppet	and	the	
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object	were	touching;	children	identified	the	correct	movie	at	a	rate	significantly	above	chance	(Wilcox	signed	rank	test,	p	<	0.002;	3.04/4	mean	correct	choices.)	For	the	positive	transitive	prompts,	the	distribution	of	these	scores	was	also	significantly	above	chance	(Wilcox	signed	rank	test,	p	<	0.001;	3.08/4	mean	causal	choices);	no	children	chose	fewer	than	two	causal	scenes	in	response	to	a	positive	prompt.	To	show	that	these	choices	did	not	result	simply	from	a	global	preference	for	the	causal	movies,	children’s	responses	to	negative	transitive	prompts	(Can	you	find	the	movie	where	
she	didn’t	wug	the	round	thing?)	were	also	analyzed.	For	these	prompts,	children’s	scores	were	significantly	below	chance	(Wilcox	signed	rank	test,	p	<	0.001,	0.88/4	mean	causal	choices);	no	children	chose	more	than	two	causal	scenes	in	response	to	a	negative	prompt.	
	
	Figure	3:	Children’s	choices	of	Causal	(“Continuous”)	vs.	Noncausal	(“Gap”)	scene	variants	following	the	three	prompts	in	Experiment	1.	Children	heard	a	manipulation	check	measuring	their	basic	understanding	of	the	scene	(“Find	where	they’re	touching”),	and	(in	counterbalanced	order)	a	positive	transitive	question	(“Find	where	she	VERBED	the	toy”)	and	a	negative	transitive	question	(“…where	she	didn’t	VERB	the	toy”).	Error	bars	represent	bootstrapped	95%	confidence	intervals.	
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Patterns	were	qualitatively	similar	and	there	were	no	significant	differences	between	the	performance	of	3	and	4	year	olds	(Wilcox	signed	rank	tests,	Control	prompt:	p=0.31,	Positive	prompt:	p	=	0.11;	Negative	prompt:	p	=	0.21).	Because	this	study	was	designed	as	a	forced-choice	task,	it	cannot	determine	the	total	range	of	scenes	that	children	might	be	willing	to	accept	as	targets	of	novel	transitive	sentences;	it	indicates	that	children	prefer	continuous	over	gap	scenes,	but	does	not	directly	measure	the	acceptability	of	the	gap	(noncausal)	scenes.	However,	some	evidence	can	be	drawn	from	those	trials	on	which	children	heard	the	negative	question	(…where	she	
didn’t	VERB	the	toy)	first.	If	children	viewed	either	scene	as	acceptable,	they	might	have	been	confused	by	this	question	and	therefore	answered	randomly.	In	fact	this	was	not	the	case:	on	trials	where	the	negative	question	was	asked	first,	children	were	somewhat	more	likely	to	select	the	gap	scenes	(62%)	than	on	trials	where	the	positive	question	was	asked	first	(45%;	these	rates	were	not	significantly	different	by	a	Wilcox	signed	rank	test).			
2.3	Discussion	Experiment	1	indicates	that	children’s	interpretation	of	transitive	verbs	draws	on	the	cognitive	capacities	they	use	for	detecting	causation	in	nonlinguistic	contexts.	Specifically,	their	verb	learning	is	sensitive	to	the	causal	structure	of	events,	and	not	only	to	coarser	contrasts	between	event	types	such	as	the	number	of	active	participants.	3-	and	4-year-olds	used	spatiotemporal	cues	to	causation	to	determine	the	meaning	of	a	novel	transitive	verb:	if	The	round	thing	wugged	was	followed	by	Sarah	wugged	the	round	thing	then	they	chose	scenes	with	the	spatiotemporal	continuity	characteristic	of	causation.		In	contrast,	if	it	was	followed	by	Sarah	didn’t	wug	the	round	thing	then	they	chose	the	‘gap’	variants	in	which	the	timing	and	contact	cues	were	disrupted.	Unlike	previous	novel	verb	
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studies,	all	other	properties	of	the	causal	and	noncausal	videos	were	matched:	the	participants,	the	actions	performed	by	the	agent,	and	the	physical	outcomes	were	identical	in	both	versions.	Thus,	rather	than	expecting	the	mere	presence	of	particular	kinds	of	sub-events,	children	expected	transitive	verbs	to	refer	to	scenes	where	those	sub-events	stood	in	particular	spatial	and	temporal	relation	to	each	other.	Because	we	had	found	in	pilot	testing	that	children	were	not	able	to	immediately	zero	in	on	the	spatiotemporal	relationships	in	these	more	complex	videos,	we	provided	our	participants	with	initial	training	that	helped	them	focus	on	this	relevant	distinction,	by	identifying	some	movies	as	causal	and	some	as	noncausal.	For	this	reason,	children	were	likely	particularly	attentive	to	the	causal	dimension	of	the	events	they	saw	during	the	novel	verb	phase.	However,	nothing	about	this	training	involved	transitive	syntax,	thus	at	minimum	children	had	to	make	a	generalization	from	the	causal	questions	they	were	asked	in	the	training	to	the	novel	transitive	sentences	they	heard	at	test.	If	the	children	had	not	expected	a	transitive-cause	mapping	they	might	have	made	a	different	inference:	when	the	question	changed	(from	‘find	where	she	made	it	happen’	to	‘find	where	she	VERBED	the	toy’),	they	might	have	made	a	pragmatic	inference	that	the	experimenter	was	now	hoping	for	a	different	kind	of	answer.	To	ensure	that	it	is	transitivity	specifically	that	children	are	using	to	guide	this	inference	about	the	test	sentences	(rather	than	the	more	specific	causal/inchoative	alternation),	Experiment	2	used	a	between-subjects	design	that	allows	us	to	contrast	the	inferences	that	children	make	about	the	critical	verbs	after	hearing	either	transitive	or	intransitive	syntactic	frames:	by	giving	just	one	frame	we	assure	that	children	hear	the	same	amount	and	diversity	of	information	about	the	novel	verbs,	and,	as	an	added	benefit,	we	test	for	causal	expectations	resulting	from	transitive	syntax	alone.		
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The	results	of	Experiment	1	are	compatible	with	the	proposal	that	children	have	a	specific	mapping	between	transitivity	and	causation.	However,	there	are	other	interpretations	of	this	finding.	First,	the	presence	of	the	spatiotemporal	gap	could	have	led	children	to	interpret	the	‘gap’	movies	as	two	separate,	sequential	events	(the	puppet’s	action,	then	the	object’s	action)	rather	than	a	single	event	involving	both	entities.	Event	segmentation	–	dividing	events	up	at	their	natural	boundaries	-	is	an	important	and	difficult	problem	(Zacks,	2010).	Some	degree	of	event	segmentation	would	seem	to	be	a	pre-requisite	for	event	conceptualization:	how	could	you	consider	possible	construals	of	an	event	if	you	hadn't	identified	some	chunk	of	experience	to	interpret?	We	know	that	spatiotemporal	contiguity	is	likely	to	play	a	role	in	children's	event	segmentation:	young	children	look	longer	at	videos	where	pauses	are	inserted	in	the	middle	of	actions,	than	ones	where	the	pauses	coincide	with	event	boundaries	(Baldwin,	Baird,	Saylor,	&	Clark,	2001).	The	process	of	segmenting	events	may	play	a	role	in	discovering	their	causal	structure:	sub-events	which	are	close	in	time	and	space	are	probably	more	likely	to	be	lumped	together	as	a	single	event	and	more	likely	to	be	causally	linked.	However,	to	understand	the	role	of	causality,	independent	of	segmentation,	we	must	also	consider	cases	where	the	difference	in	spatial	distance	and	onset	timing	of	the	two	sub-events	is	matched,	such	that	the	causal	and	non-causal	alternatives	are	likely	to	be	segmented	in	the	same	way.			The	new	stimulus	set	created	to	address	the	segmentation	issue	in	Experiment	2	also	pulls	apart	causation	and	contact.		In	Experiment	1,	causation	was	manipulated	by	the	presence	(or	absence)	or	physical	contact	between	the	agent	and	patient.	Consequently,	it	is	possible	that	children	succeeded	in	Experiment	1	by	mapping	transitivity	to	contact	rather	than	to	cause.	This	wouldn't	be	a	crazy	thing	to	do:	in	English,	many	verbs	of	
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physical	contact	appear	in	transitive	sentences	(e.g.	touch,	pat,	rub)	and,	as	we	noted	earlier,	prior	studies	have	found	that	children	prefer	to	map	transitive	verbs	to	canonical	(noncausal)	contact	scenes	rather	than	parallel	actions.	In	fact,	infants'	initial	nonlinguistic	understanding	of	causation	may	be	closely	linked	to	physical	contact	(see	also	Muentener	&	Carey,	2010).	Thus	it	is	important	to	understand	whether	children’s	novel-verb	preferences	track	with	causal	relations	independent	of	physical	contact.		To	address	these	questions,	we	return	to	the	literature	on	causal	perception	for	an	additional	early	index	of	causation.	In	addition	to	spatiotemporal	continuity,	young	infants	are	sensitive	to	spatiotemporal	order	–	if	the	second	billiard	ball’s	motion	starts	before	the	first	one	arrives	to	hit	it,	the	causal	illusion	is	broken	(Leslie	&	Keeble,	1987;	Michotte,	1963).	In	Experiment	2,	we	test	children’s	preferences	for	novel	transitive	verbs	with	stimuli	that	hold	contact	constant	and	match	the	timing	structure	of	the	sub-events:	the	delay	in	the	onset	of	the	sub-events	is	matched,	but	reversed.	In	addition,	by	using	only	a	single	syntactic	frame	with	each	novel	verb,	we	can	see	whether	the	disruption	of	causal	structure	affects	expectations	about	transitive	verbs	in	the	absence	of	any	evidence	that	they	participate	in	the	causal/inchoative	alternation.		
3.	Experiment	2	As	in	Experiment	1,	each	event	has	a	causal	version	and	noncausal	version	that	have	the	same	participants	and	the	same	sub-events.	In	Experiment	2,	the	spatial	relationships	in	the	two	versions	are	also	matched,	and	only	the	order	of	the	two	sub-events	differs.	In	the	agent-first	versions,	an	agent	makes	a	gesture,	and	1	second	later	(at	the	endpoint	of	the	actor’s	gesture),	a	toy	activates	(e.g.	lighting	up,	spinning	around).	In	the	agent-last	variants,	the	outcome	effect	begins	(apparently	spontaneously),	and	1	second	later	the	
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agent	makes	the	same	gesture.	The	timing	of	the	causal	and	noncausal	event	variations	
used	in	Experiment	2	is	illustrated	in	Figure	4.		In	order	to	dissociate	causal	interpretations	from	contact	interpretations,	all	events	used	in	Experiment	2	involve	‘action	at	a	distance’,	events	with	no	physical	contact	between	the	agent	and	patient.	These	scenes	can	be	understood	as	instances	of	a	causal	illusion,	like	the	one	that	you	might	experience	if	you	drop	a	book	on	a	table	at	the	exact	moment	that	someone	else	turns	the	lights	off.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	agent	never	touches	the	object	that	they	change,	adults	who	were	informally	queried	interpreted	the	agent-first	videos	as	causal,	presumably	because	the	outcome	followed	immediately	on	the	agent’s	action.	To	ensure	that	the	agent-last	versions	appeared	sufficiently	natural,	all	of	the	actor’s	gestures	in	Experiment	2	were	plausible	responses	to	an	interesting	event,	such	as	pointing	or	clapping.		Stimuli	can	be	viewed	online	at	http://osf.io/u6s79/.	
	
	Figure	4:	Schematic	of	an	event	contrast	used	in	Experiment	2.	Each	novel	event	was	filmed	in	a	causal	version	and	an	“agent-last”	control	which	varied	the	relative	timing	of	the	agent’s	action	and	the	beginning	of	the	outcome	effect.		
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By	removing	the	spatial	connect	between	sub-events,	Experiment	2	goes	beyond	previous	novel	verb	studies	and	allows	us	to	ask	whether	children	associate	transitive	syntax	with	events	that	involve	causation	but	not	contact.	This	new	manipulation	required	an	additional	change	in	our	experimental	design.	In	Experiment	1,	there	was	a	clear	difference	in	the	two	scenes	that	was	visible	at	the	moment	when	children	were	asked	to	select	that	correct	event	(i.e.	the	presence	or	absence	of	the	physical	gap).	This	would	not	have	been	the	case	for	the	timing	contrast	in	Experiment	2	–	at	the	end	of	both	the	causal	and	the	noncausal	events,	the	actor	has	executed	her	gesture	and	the	novel	effect	has	taken	place	(see	Figure	4).	To	address	this	issue,	children	were	given	stimuli	in	contrasting	pairs	(e.g.,	She’s	meeking	it	could	refer	to	either	the	causal	version	of	Event	7	or	the	noncausal	version	of	Event	8,	with	event	versions	randomized	between	children.)	The	event	randomization	scheme	is	illustrated	in	Figure	5;	across	children,	any	remaining	differences	
		Figure	5:	Example	of	the	randomization	scheme	used	in	Experiment	2.	One	participant	might	see	the	causal	(agent-first)	version	of	the	globe	event	and	the	non-causal	(agent-last)	version	of	the	spinner	event,	while	another	child	would	see	the	reverse.	In	the	Transitive	condition,	both	would	then	be	asked	to	identify	“where	she’s	meeking	something”.	
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in	preference	would	have	to	be	due	to	the	spatiotemporal	changes.	In	presenting	the	novel	verbs	(in	a	between-subjects	design)	we	compared	scene	choices	after	transitive	sentences	(She	meeked	the	toy)	to	two	control	conditions:	intransitive	sentences	(The	toy	meeked),	and	sentences	with	no	novel	verbs	which	directly	probed	causal	knowledge	(She	made	
something	happen.)	The	dependent	measure	of	interest	was	how	often	children	chose	the	agent-first	or	agent-last	scenes	depending	on	the	prompt	type	that	they	heard.	Under	the	specific-mapping	hypothesis,	we	should	expect	that	children	who	hear	a	transitive	prompt	(Find	
where	she	meeked	something)	will	be	more	likely	to	choose	the	causal	(agent-first)	version	of	the	test	events.	In	contrast,	children	who	hear	intransitive	prompts	(Find	where	
something	meeked)	should	have	no	such	preference.	But	if	children	attend	mainly	to	holistic	information	about	the	number	of	unique	participants	in	an	event,	both	agent-first	and	agent-last	versions	would	qualify	as	two-participant	events,	and	thus	children	should	also	have	no	preference	in	the	transitive	condition.	Finally,	the	performance	of	children	who	were	given	the	causal-knowledge	prompt	(Find	where	she	made	something	happen)	will	allow	us	to	validate	our	manipulation	(by	showing	whether	children	view	the	agent-first	scenes	as	more	causal)	and	to	determine	the	degree	to	which	performance	in	the	transitive	condition	matches	or	departs	from	children’s	ability	to	simply	report	the	causal	relationships	in	the	study	paradigm.		
3.1	Method	
3.1.1	Participants:	Preschoolers	were	recruited	from	a	local	children’s	museum	(n=74	mean	age:	4;0,	range	3;0-4;11,	37	girls),	and	tested	in	one	of	three	conditions,	Transitive	(mean	age	4;0,	12	girls),	Intransitive	(mean	age	4;0,	12	girls),	and	a	Causal	
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Knowledge	manipulation	check	control	(mean	age	4;0,	13	girls).	Participants	were	replaced	if	they	were	unable	to	reach	criteria	on	the	pretest	training	(n=20.)	Nine	additional	children	were	replaced	due	to	refusal	to	participate	or	parental	interference.	All	children	received	a	sticker	and	award	certificate	for	their	participation	at	the	end	of	the	session.	
3.1.2	Materials:	Agent-first	and	agent-last	versions	were	created	for	four	new	novel	events.	All	events	involved	a	female	actor	interacting	with	a	novel	object.	In	contrast	to	the	events	used	in	Experiment	1,	the	agent	did	not	touch	the	novel	objects,	but	made	gestures	toward	them.	The	sub-events	of	each	novel	event	are	shown	in	Table	2.	In	the	agent-first	version	of	each	movie,	the	initiation	of	the	apparatus’	effect	was	closely	timed	to	follow	to	experimenters’	gesture.	The	agent-last	version	of	each	movie	was	created	by	filming	a	version	in	which	only	the	timing	was	altered:	the	actor	began	her	gesture	1	second	after	the	apparatus	activated.	Because	all	the	actor’s	gestures	were	chosen	to	be	plausible	‘social	
Event		 Agent’s	action	 Outcome	effect	(7)	 Actor	claps	while	looking	at	globe	box	 Globe	lights	up	and	spins	around	(8)	 Actor	points	at	windmill	box	 Windmill	spins	(9)	 Actor	slaps	the	table	 Balanced	pendulum	tips	over	and	swings	(10)	 Actor	raises	both	hands	toward	herself	 Window	shade	pops	up		Table	2:	Novel	events	used	for	verb-learning	trials	in	Experiment	2.	Causal	and	non-causal	versions	were	created	by	varying	which	of	the	two	sub-events	began	first.	Note	that	while	outcome	effects	are	repeated	from	the	novel	events	(1)-(6)	used	in	Experiment	1,	the	spatiotemporal	relationships	between	agent	actions	and	outcomes	differ	(see	Figure	4).		
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responses’	to	an	interesting	effect,	adults	who	were	informally	queried	found	these	movies	natural,	but	did	not	view	the	actor	as	playing	a	causal	role.		In	all	videos,	the	event	was	played	through	three	times,	ending	on	a	still	shot	showing	the	result	and	the	final	position	of	the	experimenter.	Videos	varied	between	four	and	five	seconds	in	total	length	and	the	agent-first	and	agent-last	versions	of	each	event	were	equal	in	length.	In	addition	to	these	stimuli,	two	additional	causal	movies	and	two	additional	‘social	response’	movies	were	used	during	the	pretest	trials.		Video	stimuli	were	presented	in	the	same	manner	as	Experiment	1,	and	the	helicopter	toy	was	also	used	for	the	warm-up	phase	of	Experiment	2.	
3.1.3	Procedure:	As	in	Experiment	1,	each	session	consisted	of	an	introduction,	a	pretest	and	the	main	novel	verb	test.	During	the	introduction,	children	were	introduced	to	‘my	friend	Sarah’,	a	puppet	who	liked	to	say	silly	words.	After	this	the	experimenter	showed	them	the	helicopter	apparatus,	demonstrating	that	Sometimes,	Sarah	makes	it	
happen,	like	this...But	sometimes,	she	just	watches	it	happen,	it	happens	on	its	own	because	
there’s	a	battery	inside.	Then	the	Sarah	puppet	either	approached	the	toy	without	touching	it,	and	then	the	helicopter	activated,	or	she	approached	it	after	activation.	Note	that	the	demonstrations	for	Experiment	2	were	different	from	the	one	for	Experiment	1	in	two	critical	ways:	Sarah	never	touched	the	toy,	but	in	the	causal	version	the	toy	activated	
immediately	when	Sarah	approached.	Thus	the	perception	of	cause	was	driven	by	temporal	contingency	rather	than	contact.	After	this	demonstration,	children	were	prompted	to	activate	the	toy	(again	without	contact),	and	shown	again	that	it	could	activate	spontaneously.	Then	the	experimenter	prepared	children	for	the	rest	of	the	session	by	explaining	that	in	the	movies	they	would	see,	Sometimes,	my	friend	Hannah	makes	
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something	happen.	And	sometimes	she	just	watches	it	happen	–	it	happens	on	its	own	because	
there’s	a	battery	inside.	As	in	Experiment	1,	children	never	heard	any	events	described	with	transitive	sentences	during	the	warm-up.	Children	then	moved	to	the	video	presentation,	beginning	with	two	pretest	trials	which	used	the	training	movies	described	above.	Each	pretest	trial	consisted	of	one	agent-first	and	agent-last	movie.	The	child	viewed	the	two	videos,	one	at	a	time,	and	was	asked	after	each	video	whether	the	actor	made	it	happen	or	watched	it	happen.	Finally	the	children	were	asked	to	Find	where	she	made	it	happen	and	Find	where	she	watched	it	
happen.	Children	who	could	not	provide	correct	answers	to	3	out	of	the	4	total	forced-choice	questions	in	the	pretest	were	not	included	in	the	analysis.	20	children	were	replaced	for	this	reason,	a	higher	rate	than	in	Experiment	1,	indicating	that	children	might	have	had	more	difficulty	passing	the	first	precondition	of	recognizing	the	critical	movies	as	causal.	Thus	in	both	experiments	we	analyze	data	from	children	who	did	understand	the	causal	structure	of	the	movies;	the	difference	in	inclusion	rates	might	mean	that	we	are	analyzing	slightly	different	sub-populations	of	preschoolers	in	the	two	studies.	During	the	novel	verb	test,	children	saw	two	trials.	The	trial	order,	as	well	as	version	and	side	presentation	for	each	trial,	was	randomized	for	each	child.	In	each	trial,	children	saw	the	agent-first	version	of	an	event	(e.g.	Event	7)	on	one	side	of	the	screen,	and	the	agent-last	version	of	a	different	event	(e.g.	Event	8)	on	the	other.	On	each	trial,	children	saw	the	contrasting	movies	presented	sequentially,	accompanied	by	identical,	neutral	voiceovers	(Look	over	here,	look	at	that,	wow!)	Children	were	then	reminded	that	In	one	
movie	Sarah	made	it	happen,	and	in	one	movie	she	didn’t.	Finally,	children	watched	both	movies	playing	simultaneously	a	final	time,	accompanied	by	a	voiceover	appropriate	to	the	
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between-subjects	condition:	Transitive:	She's	gonna	meek	something.	She	meeked	it!	Wow,	she	meeked	it!	Intransitive:	Something's	gonna	meek.	It	meeked!	Wow,	it	meeked!	Causal	Knowledge:	She’s	gonna	make	something	happen.	She	made	it	happen!	Wow,	
she	made	it	happen.	The	final	freeze-frames	for	both	movies	persisted,	and	children	were	asked	to	select	the	movie	where	she	meeked	it/where	it	meeked/where	she	made	something	happen.	The	experimenter	waited	until	the	child	selected	a	video	before	continuing,	providing	only	general	prompts	(Go	ahead	and	pick!)	if	the	child	did	not	immediately	point.	
3.2	Results	All	results	and	analyses	for	Experiment	2	are	available	on	the	Open	Science	Framework	at	http://osf.io/u6s79/.	Our	analyses	focused	on	how	often	children	chose	agent-first	or	agent-last	versions	of	the	events	and	whether	this	depended	on	the	type	of	prompt	that	they	heard.	The	dependent	measure	was	the	number	of	test	trials	(out	of	two)	on	which	the	child	selected	the	agent-first	scene.	The	results	of	Experiment	2	are	summarized	in	Figure	6.	Children	who	heard	the	causal	manipulation	check	questions	selected	the	agent-first	scenes	at	a	rate	above	chance	but	below	ceiling	(Wilcox	signed	rank	test,	p	=	0.048;	1.32/2	mean	causal	choices),	indicating	that	the	contingency	was	used	to	infer	a	causal	link	between	the	two	events	but	that	either	the	inference	was	difficult	for	children	to	make	or	the	task	itself	was	demanding.	Children	who	heard	transitive	prompts,	also	showed	a	significant	preference	for	the	agent-first	scene	(Wilcox	signed	rank	test,	p	<	0.002;	1.5/2	mean	causal	choices).	This	was	not	the	case	for	children	who	heard	intransitive	prompts	(Wilcox	signed	rank	test,	
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p	=	0.35;	1.12/2	mean	causal	choices).		In	addition	to	differences	from	chance,	we	also	performed	planned	comparisons	of	the	Transitive	versus	Intransitive	conditions,	and	of	the	Transitive	versus	Causal	Knowledge	conditions.	Children	in	the	Transitive	condition	were	more	likely	to	choose	agent-first	scenes	than	the	children	in	the	Intransitive	condition	(Wilcoxon	signed	rank	test,	p	=	0.03).	Performance	in	the	Transitive	and	Causal	Knowledge	conditions	were	not	statistically	different	from	one	another	(Wilcoxon	signed	rank	test,	p	=	0.46).		There	were	no	significant	differences	between	the	performance	of	3	and	4	year	olds,	
	
	Figure	6:	Children’s	choices	of	Causal	vs.	Noncausal	(agent-first	versus	agent-last)	scene	variants	following	the	three	prompts	in	Experiment	2.		Experiment	2	was	conducted	between	participants:	children	heard	either	a	causal	manipulation	check	measuring	children’s	basic	understanding	of	the	scene	(“Find	where	she	made	something	happen”),	a	positive	transitive	novel	verb	(“…where	she	VERBED	something”,	or	an	intransitive	novel	verb	(“…where	something	VERBED”).	Error	bars	represent	bootstrapped	95%	confidence	intervals.	
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and	patterns	were	qualitatively	similar	across	the	three	conditions	(Wilcox	signed	rank	tests,	Transitive	prompt:	p	=	0.09;	Intransitive	prompt:	p	=	0.75,	Control	prompt:	p	=0.26).	Three-year-olds	in	the	Transitive	condition	chose	causal	scenes	somewhat	less	often	than	four-year-olds	(1.31/2	vs.	1.73/2	mean	causal	choices);	however,	this	was	also	true	for	the	Causal	Knowledge	control	condition	(1.14/2	vs.	1.55/2	mean	causal	choices),	indicating	that	this	difference	had	to	do	with	relative	success	at	identifying	the	causal	relation	or	proficiency	on	the	task	in	general.	
3.3	Discussion	In	Experiment	2,	children	showed	a	clear	preference	to	map	new	transitive	verbs	to	causal	scenes,	rather	than	closely	matched	noncausal	foils.	Specifically,	children	who	were	asked	to	Find	where	she	meeked	something	usually	chose	events	where	the	agent	moved	before	the	onset	of	the	outcome	action,	rather	than	where	she	moved	after	its	onset.	This	preference	was	specific	to	transitive	verbs:	Children	who	heard	Find	where	something	
meeked	did	not	show	this	pattern.	In	fact,	children	learning	transitive	verbs	performed	just	like	children	who	were	asked	to	find	Where	she	made	something	happen,	suggesting	that	their	errors	in	the	transitive	condition	were	due	to	uncertainty	about	the	causal	structure	or	lapses	in	attention,	rather	than	uncertainty	about	the	mapping	between	transitive	verbs	and	causal	scenes	in	general.		These	results	indicate	that	children	are	able	to	take	fine	grained	spatiotemporal	information	into	account	when	determining	the	meaning	of	a	novel	verb.	The	causal	and	noncausal	stimuli	in	this	experiment	were	constructed	to	match	timing	delays	(as	well	as	participant	and	sub-event	information)	–	in	both	types	of	movies,	one	sub-event	was	initiated	one	second	after	the	other.	Knowing	that	an	intentional	gesture	by	an	agent	can	
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have	causal	power	is	not	sufficient	–	only	when	the	agent's	action	preceded	the	physical	outcome	(rather	than	vice	versa),	did	children	interpret	the	scene	as	causal	and	map	novel	transitive	verbs	to	that	scene.	This	expectation	for	the	transitive	frame	occurred	in	the	absence	of	any	evidence	that	the	verb	appears	in	the	causal/inchoative	alternation	(which	is	more	diagnostic	of	causal	transitives	in	English).	In	this	respect,	children	are	similar	to	English-speaking	adults	who	also	assign	causal	meanings	to	novel	verbs	presented	in	the	transitive	alone	(Kako,	2006).	Interestingly,	the	noncausal	foils	used	in	Experiment	2	(where	the	agent	acts	after	the	toy	moves)	can	be	plausibly	described	by	another	class	of	English	transitive	verbs,	e.g.	
She	applauded	the	orchestra.	This	is	because	we	chose	gestures,	such	as	clapping,	that	could	be	either	goal-directed	actions	or	reactions	to	a	surprising	or	interesting	event.	In	the	real	world,	causal	actions	and	event	reactions	are	likely	distinguishable	on	many	other	grounds,	but	in	Experiment	2	only	the	timing	information	differentiated	these	classes.	This	study	thus	shows	that	children’s	preferences	for	transitive	verb	meanings	are	sensitive	to	the	same	kind	of	fine-grained	spatiotemporal	information	that	guides	infants’	early	nonlinguistic	understanding	of	causal	events.			
4.	General	Discussion	Across	two	experiments,	children	aged	three	and	four	years	old	had	a	bias	to	map	transitive	syntax	to	causal	scenes.	Unlike	all	previous	studies	of	this	kind,	we	manipulated	specific	spatiotemporal	cues	to	causation,	rather	than	using	contrasting	prototypes	from	two	different	event	categories.	This	advance	reveals	that	children’s	expectations	about	transitive	verbs	are	influenced	by	their	nonlinguistic	understanding	of	causal	events:	when	
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 36	
two	alternatives	have	identical	sub-events,	and	differ	only	in	the	spatial	and	temporal	relations	between	those	sub-events,	children	expect	transitive	syntax	to	refer	to	scenes	where	the	agent's	sub-event	is	a	plausible	cause	of	the	outcome.	In	Experiment	1,	this	was	implemented	by	contrasting	intact	causal	interactions	with	scenes	with	a	spatial	gap	and	temporal	pause	between	the	agent’s	action	and	the	outcome	event.		In	Experiment	2,	it	was	implemented	by	reversing	the	order	of	the	agent's	action	and	the	activation	of	the	toy.		In	both	cases	3-4	year	old	children	linked	the	verbs	that	appeared	in	the	transitive	frame	with	the	causal	variant.	Critically,	the	scenes	used	in	Experiment	2	involved	no	physical	contact	between	the	agents	and	the	toys	(in	either	variant).		Both	adults	and	children	interpreted	these	scenes	as	casual	when	the	agent’s	action	came	first,	though	they	are	certainly	not	prototypical	examples	of	a	causal	event.		Children's	success	with	these	events	indicates	that	by	3	years	of	age	their	syntactic	mappings	reflect	a	broad	and	robust	notion	of	causation.			The	two	experiments	also	differed	in	the	range	of	syntactic	frames	that	the	verb	appeared	in.		In	Experiment	1,	the	transitive	verbs	appeared	in	the	causal/inchoative	alternation	which	is	used	solely	with	causal	verbs	in	English.	In	Experiment	2,	the	transitive	verbs	never	appeared	in	the	intransitive	frame	and	thus	there	was	no	evidence	that	the	verbs	could	be	used	in	the	inchoative	alternation.		In	English,	transitive	verbs	may	be	causal	(break)	or	they	may	not	(applaud,	touch).	The	tendency	to	link	transitive	verbs	to	causal	scenes	even	in	the	absence	of	this	distinctive	syntactic	alternation	is	consistent	with	the	cross-linguistic	connection	between	transitivity	and	causation,	and	the	tendency	for	adult	English	speakers	to	interpret	novel	transitive	verbs	as	causal	(Kako	&	Wagner,	2001;	Kako,	2006;	Levin	&	Rappaport	Hovav,	2005).		
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This	work	represents	an	important	advance	in	our	understanding	of	how	young	children	map	between	syntactic	structures	and	semantic	event	representations.	Our	results	strongly	suggest	that	children	have	a	mapping	between	a	fairly	abstract	nonlinguistic	notion	of	causation	and	the	transitive	construction,	ruling	out	a	number	of	alternatives.	3-4-year-olds’	preferences	do	not	rest	solely	on	properties	of	the	agent’s	action,	the	nature	of	the	outcome,	or	the	mere	presence	of	two	active	participants,	although	these	additional	cues	may	be	important	parts	of	naturalistic	verb	learning.	In	distinguishing	between	these	possible	referents	of	a	new	transitive	verb,	children	attend	to	exactly	those	event	cues	that	drive	their	awareness	of	causal	events	from	infancy.	This	suggests	that,	by	the	preschool	years,	children	possess	(in	addition	to	other	possible	constraints)	a	relatively	specific	mapping	between	transitive	syntax	and	causal	events.	This	conclusion	makes	predictions	about	a	range	of	other	manipulations	that	should	affect	transitive	verb	learning.	For	example,	Gopnik	and	colleagues	(2004)	have	demonstrated	that	children	can	use	patterns	of	covariation	to	determine	which	of	several	possible	causes	is	responsible	for	an	effect	(using	the	‘blicket	detector’	paradigm).	If	children	interpret	transitive	verbs	as	encoding	their	nonlinguistic	conception	of	cause,	then	they	should	assume	that	a	novel	transitive	verb	picks	out	the	event	with	the	statistically	probable	cause	even	if	no	spatiotemporal	cues	to	causation	are	present	in	the	events	that	are	currently	being	labeled.		
4.1	Learning	Noncausal	verbs	On	the	other	hand,	an	understanding	of	causality	alone	will	be	insufficient	for	children	to	learn	the	meanings	associated	with	transitive	syntax	in	English:	many	common	transitive	verbs	like	enter,	touch,	love,	and	see	do	not	have	obvious	causal	components	to	their	meaning.	These	additional	transitive	verbs	are	not	random:	they	are	organized	into	
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clusters	of	verbs	that	participate	in	the	same	alternations	and	share	aspects	of	meaning		(cf.	Levin,	1993).	Children	learning	languages	like	English	(i.e.	those	that	have	several	different	meanings	for	the	transitive)	know	and	use	many	noncausal	transitives	in	a	broadly	adult-like	way	by	the	time	they	are	three	years	old	(Fenson	et	al.,	2000,	Wagner	2010).	However,	we	do	know	that	English-learning	preschoolers	struggle	to	learn	some	kinds	of	noncausal	transitives.	Even	though	(noncausal)	subject-experiencer	verbs	like	fear	are	more	common	by	token	frequency,	children	appear	to	have	more	difficulty	interpreting	these	non-causal	relationships	correctly	(Hartshorne,	Pogue,	&	Snedeker,	2015).	Similarly,	Naigles	and	Kako	(1993)	suggest	that	children	may	fail	to	map	new	transitive	verbs	to	contact	events	when	a	causal	alternative	is	available.		One	way	children	might	learn	noncausal	transitives	is	syntactic	bootstrapping	across	multiple	contexts.		Specifically,	children	could	note	the	range	of	syntactic	frames	that	different	verbs	appear	in,	and	expect	commonalities	in	the	meaning	of	verbs	that	are	used	in	similar	ways	(Fisher,	Gleitman	&	Gleitman	1991,	Gleitman	1990,	Landau	&	Gleitman	1985).	Several	novel-verb	studies	have	shown	that	children	prefer	different	kinds	of	event	prototypes	following	different	syntactic	alternations	(see	e.g.	Fernandes,	Marcus,	Di	Nubila,	&	Vouloumanos,	2006;	Naigles,	1996,	1998;	Scott	&	Fisher,	2009).	The	results	of	the	present	studies	show	both	the	availability	of	and	the	limits	to	this	strategy	for	the	broader	verb-learning	problem.	If	children	understand	the	information	carried	by	the	causal/inchoative	alternation,	as	supported	by	Experiment	1,	then	the	failure	of	a	particular	verb	to	participate	in	it	could	serve	as	a	(probabilistic)	source	of	evidence	for	some	other	noncausal	meaning.	But	Experiment	2	shows	that	children’s	causal	biases	go	beyond	transitive	verbs	that	participate	in	the	inchoative	alternation.	Thus,	while	a	specific	
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mapping	between	causation	and	transitive	syntax	gives	children	an	advantage	for	learning	some	verbs,	it	could	also	be	a	disadvantage	for	learning	other	transitive	verbs,	requiring	more	evidence	to	override,	just	as	a	bias	to	interpret	novel	nouns	as	labels	for	whole	objects	can	make	learning	other	kinds	of	nouns	more	challenging	(Markman,	1992).		As	far	as	we	know	it	is	currently	an	open	empirical	question	whether	children	in	fact	require	more	evidence	(either	linguistic	or	nonlinguistic)	to	learn	a	novel	noncausal	transitive	verb.	In	addition	to	event	structure,	transitivity	is	also	connected	in	a	complex	way	with	how	those	events	are	measured	out,	a	feature	known	as	telicity,	which	describes	whether	an	event	is	completed	or	ongoing	from	a	particular	perspective.	For	many	verbs,	the	direct	object	defines	the	end	point	of	an	event	(I	ate	the	apple,	called	an	incremental	theme	by	Dowty,	1991).	Some	causal	verbs	are	also	telic,	but	the	class	of	transitive	verbs	which	are	telic	also	extends	to	other	events	like	motion	(i.e.	reaching	an	endpoint	in	space).	Like	the	relationship	between	cause	and	transitivity,	this	telicity	linkage	is	imperfect.		The	end	point	of	an	event	can	also	be	defined	by	prepositional	phrase	(John	walked	to	the	store)	and	transitive	verbs	do	not	necessarily	have	defined	end	points	(Mary	drank	juice).	Nevertheless,	adding	a	direct	object	often	results	in	adding	an	endpoint	(I	dance/I	dance	a	
waltz),	leading	to	a	telic	interpretation	of	the	event	in	the	right	grammatical	contexts.	Children	as	young	as	2	years	old	expect	novel	transitive	verbs	to	refer	to	completed	(telic)	event	perspectives,	even	when	there	is	no	causal	component	to	the	activity	(such	as	a	character	entering	a	room,	Hohenstein	et	al.	2004;	Wagner,	2010).		While	both	telicity	and	causality	involve	an	encoding	of	the	result	of	an	event	(a	newly-finished	built	house,	a	newly-broken	lamp),	the	concepts	do	not	reduce	to	one	another,	and	they	can	have	independent	grammatical	representation	(e.g.	separate	morphological	markers)	within	the	
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same	language	(cf.	Dryer	et	al.	2013).	Despite	all	of	this,	by	the	time	they	are	preschoolers,	children	have	put	together	a	rich	theory	of	how	event	perspectives	map	to	syntax,	despite	cross-linguistic	variation	and	the	intersecting	properties	of	transitive	sentences.	
4.2	Models	of	event	representation	for	language	 	In	these	studies,	we	created	events	that	differed	in	their	spatiotemporal	properties	and	assessed	which	event	the	participants	thought	a	sentence	with	a	novel	verb	referred	to.	Our	goal	was	answer	questions	about	the	meaning	that	children	attribute	to	transitive	sentences.	But	since	internal	representations	of	meaning	cannot	be	directly	manipulated,	our	study	–	like	all	other	mapping	studies	–	is	open	to	a	number	of	interpretations.	How	are	these	meanings	represented	in	the	mind?	One	possibility	is	that	the	process	merely	involves	tracking	individual	features	of	events	and	sentences	to	determine	the	correct	weighting	of	each	cue,	based	on	the	properties	of	the	language	in	question.	This	approach	faces	an	immediate	problem:	the	same	event	can	be	described	many	ways.	In	the	causal	scenes	presented	in	Experiment	2,	a	person	might	choose	to	focus	on	and	mention	the	causal	relationship	(She’s	making	it	go!),	the	outcome	effect	(It’s	spinning!),	or	the	agent’s	action	alone	(“Look,	she’s	pointing!”),	among	others.		
It thus seems clear that children use some kind of structured representation of events 
(rather than purely holistic ‘snapshots’) to put an event perspective into words. How do children 
represent event structures at right level for doing this? Are those representations shared with 
other cognitive processes, or are they part of a language-specific semantic system? Many 
theories of argument structure implicitly or explicitly try to define what might be necessary for a 
meaning-representation system to be able to produce the patterns of syntax that we see. One such 
possibility is found in Dowty’s (1991) theory of Agent and Patient proto-roles, which proposes 
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that the syntactic position of arguments (as subject and object) is determined by a set of features 
or criteria that define prototypical roles. Prototypical agents are sentient, they are volitionally 
involved in the event, and they are causers. Prototypical patients undergo changes of states, are 
affected by the event, and tend to be stationary or inanimate. The argument with the most agent-
like features will become the subject of the sentence, even if both arguments have some features 
from both categories.  Although this is a theory about event participants, it implicitly defines a 
theory of what event representations are like: they are an asymmetrical relation between two (or 
more) elements, roughly of the form [Proto-Agent ACTS-ON Proto-Patient]. This approach can 
explain many patterns of argument realization in language, but it leaves some intriguing 
questions open. In particular, it misses an important level of organization: it is probably not an 
accident that ideal proto-Agents are both sentient and volitional, or that the “causer” feature of 
proto-Agents is mirrored by the “caus-ee” feature of proto-Patients (see Levin & Rappaport-
Hovav, 2005 for discussion). 
Another class of approaches focuses not on the agent-hood of participants, but on the 
decomposition of verb meanings into structured representations. These representations are 
intended to factor apart what is shared across verbs from what is not - their idiosyncratic root 
meanings (like the difference between heating and cooling).  In these theories, causal verbs are 
semantically represented with an internal structure that references the dimensions of meaning 
that matter for syntax (e.g. like  [X CAUSE [BECOME [Y open]]] cf. Jackendoff, 1983; Van 
Valin & La Polla 1997; Croft 2012; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav 2005). These theories make some 
aspects of why event properties are related in syntactic realization explicit: many transitive verbs 
have both a “causer” and “caus-ee” because there is an associated event structure with two 
distinct positions (X,Y) corresponding to these roles, containing a predicate CAUSE that refers 
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to a representation of what causal events are like. These structures also implicitly explain other 
generalizations about verb and sentence meaning: if (as is the case) humans make good causers, 
than many agents of causal sentences will also be human (as is the case).  Of course, we are left 
with a similar question as before: why do we have structures like [X CAUSE [BECOME 
[Y<state>]]] and [Z BECOME-AT W<location>] instead of some other set, and why is it that 
both X and Z (rather than Y and W) are reliably the subjects of sentences?  
Both of these event-perspective representation options leave us with the problem of 
explaining why the system is set up the way it is. It is possible that semantic mapping patterns 
occur for language-specific reasons related to the underlying nature of syntax. For instance, 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav suggest that the correlation between telicity and syntax is a side 
effect of the hierarchical nature of semantic structures (2005, chapter 4.2) Arguments that 
measure out events are typically arguments of an embedded sub-event (in their framework), 
consequentially they generally surface as direct objects or prepositional phrases (build a house, 
walk to the store).  However, when the embedded event does not define the end point (roll the 
ball), the affected entity still surfaces as the direct object because the broad general mapping 
principles make no references to telicity per se.    
Another possibility is that the nature of syntax-to-meaning mappings is related to how we 
non-linguistically represent events. This might happen alongside language-specific phenomena. 
In Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s account, they argue that the connection between transitivity and 
cause (unlike the connection to telicity) is a principled one because each sub-event in a semantic 
structure must introduce a new argument, and causal events necessarily have two sub-events.  If 
structural patterns in language arise from mappings like these, we need to understand how these 
structures are created: how do our general cognitive capacities for understanding events (in terms 
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of cause and other dimensions) get connected in just the right way to an abstract representational 
system leading to external human language? 
Understanding these nonlinguistic representations may be key to fully explaining why 
human language is the way it is. In the case of transitivity, it is not surprising that animacy of the 
subject, physical contact, causal relationships, and goals are all features of many transitive verbs, 
because these three properties are closely related in early cognition (and subsequently in our 
adult common-sense expectations about how the world works). Even babies expect that causing 
changes usually requires contact, and that people have a special status both as causers and 
‘havers of goals’ (c.f. Muentener & Carey, 2010; Saxe, Tenenbaum & Carey, 2005; Woodward, 
1998).  Yet the exact details of these early representations are still debated; it is not clear which 
if any of these ways of seeing events are primary for babies learning to understand and organize 
the world around them.  
Over the past two decades, there has been an increasing appreciation for the role that 
richly structured models of the world play in the cognitive processes of both adults and children 
(cf. Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997). Rather than representing important categories with prototypical 
examples or critical features, cognitive representations are embedded in a system of 
meaningfully related concepts that can support flexible kinds of inference– for instance people 
may have a theory of physics which incorporates ideas about weight, motion, causality and 
allows them to make arbitrary new predictions such as whether a particular block tower will fall 
over (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum 2013). Perhaps children use these same kinds of 
cognitive models to determine which types of relationships can be expressed by a particular 
linguistic structure (see Hartshorne, Pogue & Snedeker 2015 for related ideas). In this view, the 
distinct-but-related roles of causality, telicity, and other features of meaning associated with 
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transitive syntax may result from the flexibility and richness of the underlying cognitive models: 
just as they can support new on-the-fly predictions, these cognitive models could support the 
learning of multiple subtle, related, and yet very abstract generalizations that are reflected in the 
grammatical structure of human languages.  
4.3 Developmental trajectory 
Returning to the specific dimension of meaning addressed in these studies, our findings 
also raise the question of how mappings between cause and transitivity (whatever 
representational form they take) emerge during development. We see three possible accounts of 
how the observed mapping that is established by the preschool years could develop. First, as 
proposed by Fisher and colleagues (Yuan, Fisher & Snedeker, 2012), younger toddlers may 
begin with a global bias to match the number of linguistic arguments to the number of event 
participants, leading to the broad ‘two participant’ preference for transitive verbs discussed in the 
introduction. As they learn their native language and as their nonlinguistic cognition develops, 
additional more specific biases for event construals (e.g. expectations about cause, contact, or 
telicity) might arise if and when they are supported by evidence from the particular language the 
child is learning. At a minimum we know that there must be some change in this mapping over 
time, because languages differ in the range of events described by transitive syntax (Haspelmath, 
1993; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav 2005). 
Alternately, like preschoolers, infants might have additional biases about the links 
between events and the basic structures of language. These biases could result from language-
specific expectations, from more general expectations about communication and social 
interaction (e.g. Tomasello, 1992), or from an expectation that language will mirror nonlinguistic 
cognitive representations (e.g. Pinker, 1989). To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing 
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work that clearly demonstrates that the specific cause-transitivity bias we show exists in younger 
children. While prior work suggests that children as young as 19-21 months prefer to map 
transitive verbs to prototypical causative scenes over other scene categories (Arunachalam et al., 
2013; Yuan et al., 2012), the scene contrasts used in these studies vary along multiple 
dimensions leaving the conceptual basis of the preference unclear. There are, however, good 
reasons for supposing that a causal-transitive bias might be present early in life. As we noted 
earlier, while causal knowledge develops throughout life, some of the guiding principles of 
causal reasoning are in place by 6 months of age (Leslie & Keeble, 1987). Furthermore, the 
cause/transitive mapping is cross-linguistically robust, raising the possibility that it has origins in 
conceptual and learning biases that young children bring to the problem of language acquisition 
(though see Christiansen & Chater (2009) for other explanations of cross-linguistic patterns). 
This hypothesis would be particularly compatible with theories where causation plays a central 
role in argument structure (e.g. Croft, 2012).  
Complicating this question is the fact that children are not born with fully adult-like 
causal knowledge. While spatiotemporal cues to causation affect infants’ attention from the first 
year of life, children initially have very different expectations than adults about the causal 
powers of animate and inanimate entities (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Muentener & Carey, 2010). 
Any theory involving early connections between argument structure and causation will have to 
account for how children associate linguistic representations with cognitive representations that 
are themselves still developing (e.g. ‘agent’, ‘causation’, etc.). Understanding the development 
of early syntax-to-meaning representations therefore will necessarily involve progress on many 
fronts: we will need to understand the development of these nonlinguistic representations, the 
development of the syntactic representations that express them, and the nature of the mappings 
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that relate them. The methods presented in this study provide an important avenue for beginning 
to answer these questions. 
4.4 Conclusion 
These experiments are the first novel-verb comprehension studies to examine the 
mappings between children’s argument structure knowledge and their nonlinguistic causal 
models of the world. We show that children use syntactic information to guide inferences about 
transitive verb meaning that are closely related to their nonlinguistic concepts of causation. This 
finding shows the importance of exploration into the relationship between children’s linguistic 
and nonlinguistic knowledge. If we can clarify how children’s inferences about word and 
sentence meaning make contact with their nonlinguistic representations, then we will be better 
equipped to understand how children learn about the world from second-hand testimony, 
updating their beliefs about world from the sentences they hear (Bonawitz et al., 2010; Harris & 
Koenig, 2006; Harris, 2002; Nazzi & Gopnik, 2001; Schulz et al., 2008).  
Critically, this study shows that any examination of the semantics of early language must 
be considered a question of cognitive development as well as linguistic development. 
Understanding early representations of verb argument structure will require understanding how 
children in the first few years of life are representing the scenes they see. Even as infants, young 
language-learners also have rich, but not necessarily adult-like, representations of what 
constitutes an agent, a cause, or an event (Baker et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2009; Sobel et al., 2004; 
Spelke, 1990; Woodward, 1998). Any detailed understanding of what children encode in their 
early verb meanings must reckon with the kinds of meaning that a young toddler might have 
available to encode in language.  As has been frequently noted before (c.f. Pinker, 1989), it does 
not seem likely to be a coincidence that many of the proposed central primitives in argument 
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structure theories are also available to the young child -- but we do not yet know what makes an 
early cognitive representation a candidate for becoming part of the grammar (on either 
evolutionary or developmental timescales).  
Exploration into children’s early linguistic representations is a critical part of the effort to 
understand how humans of all ages represent events (Baldwin et al., 2001; Baldwin, Andersson, 
Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; Wolff, 2008; Zacks, 2010). By bringing together the linguistic tests for 
novel verb comprehension with stimulus manipulations from research on prelinguistic cognition, 
we can make detailed, testable predictions about how children make inferences about language 
from the events they see, and how language in turn reflects the structure of event representations. 
	 	
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 48	
5.	References	
Arunachalam, S., Escovar, E., Hansen, M. A., & Waxman, S. (2013). Out of sight, but not out of 
mind: 21-month-olds use syntactic information to learn verbs even in the absence of a 
corresponding event. Language and Cognitive Processes, 28(4), 417–425. 
doi:10.1080/01690965.2011.641744 
Arunachalam, S., & Waxman, S. (2010). Meaning from syntax: Evidence from 2-year-olds. 
Cognition, 114(3), 442–446. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.10.015 
Baker, C., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2011). Bayesian Theory of Mind: Modeling Joint 
Belief-Desire Attribution. In L. Carlson, C. Hoelscher, & T. Shipley (Eds.), Proceedings 
of the 33rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 
Baker, M. (1988). Incorporation: A Theory of Grammatical Function Changing. Chicag: 
Chicago University Press. 
Baldwin, D., Baird, J. A., Saylor, M. M., & Clark, M. A. (2001). Infants Parse Dynamic Action. 
Child Development, 72(3), 708–717. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00310 
Baldwin, D., Andersson, A., Saffran, J., & Meyer, M. (2008). Segmenting dynamic human 
action via statistical structure. Cognition, 106(3), 1382–1407. doi: 
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.005 
Battaglia, P. W., Hamrick, J., Tenenbaum, J. (2013). Simulation as an engine of physical scene 
understanding. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110 (45), 18327-
18332. 
Bonawitz, E. B., Ferranti, D., Saxe, R., Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., Woodward, J., & Schulz, L. 
E. (2010). Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ 
causal inferences. Cognition, 115(1), 104–117. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.12.001 
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 49	
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10, 433–436. 
Brown, R. (1958). Words and Things: An Introduction to Language. New York, N.Y: Free Press. 
Christiansen, M. H., & Chater, N. (2009). The myth of language universals and the myth of 
universal grammar. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(05), 452–453. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990641 
Croft, W. (2012). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67(3), 547–619. 
Dryer, Matthew S. & Haspelmath, Martin (eds.) 2013.  
The World Atlas of Language Structures Online.  
Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology.  
(Available online at http://wals.info, Accessed on 2016-01-25.)  
Fenson, L., Pethick, S., Renda, C., Cox, J. L., Dale, P. S., & Reznick, J. S. (2000). Short form 
versions of the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventories. Applied 
Psycholinguistics, 21, 95–115. doi:10.1017/S0142716400001053 
Fernandes, K. J., Marcus, G. F., Di Nubila, J. A., & Vouloumanos, A. (2006). From semantics to 
syntax and back again: Argument structure in the third year of life. Cognition, 100(2), 
B10–B20. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2005.08.003 
Fillmore, C. (1968). The case for case. In E. Bach & R. T. Harms (Eds.), Universals in Linguistic 
Theory (pp. 1–90). New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. 
Fisher, C. (1996). Structural limits on verb mapping: The role of analogy in children’s 
interpretations of sentences. Cognitive Psychology, 31(1), 41–81. 
doi:10.1006/cogp.1996.0012 
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 50	
Fisher, C., Gertner, Y., Scott, R. M., & Yuan, S. (2010). Syntactic bootstrapping. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1, 143–149. doi:10.1002/wcs.17 
Fisher, C., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman, H. (1991). On the semantic content of subcategorization 
frames. Cognitive Psychology, 23, 331–392.  
Folli, R., & Harley, H. (2008). Teleology and animacy in external arguments. Lingua, 118(2), 
190–202. doi:10.1016/j.lingua.2007.02.004 
Gilette, J., Gleitman, H., Gleitman, L. R., & Lederer, A. (1999). Human simulations of 
vocabulary learning. Cognition, 73, 135–176. 
Gleitman, L. R. (1990). The structural sources of verb meanings. Language Acquisition, 1, 3–55. 
Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E., Kushnir, T., & Danks, D. (2004). A 
Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets. Psychological 
Review, 111(1), 3–32. 
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997). Words, thoughts, and theories. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
Hale, K., & Keysar, S. (1993). On argument structure and the lexical expression of syntactic 
relations. In K. Hale & S. Keysar (Eds.), The view from Building 20: Essays in honor of 
Sylvain Bromberger. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harris, P. L. (2002). What do children learn from testimony? In P. Carruthers, M. Siegal, & S. 
Stich (Eds.), Cognitive bases of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harris, P. L., & Koenig, M. A. (2006). Trust in Testimony: How Children Learn About Science 
and Religion. Child Development, 77(3), 505–524. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2006.00886.x 
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 51	
Hartshorne, J. K., Pogue, A., & Snedeker, J. (2015). Love is hard to understand: The relationship 
between transitivity and caused events in the acquisition of emotion verbs. Journal of 
Child Language, 42, 467–504. 
Haspelmath, M. (1993). More on the typology of inchoative/causative verb alternations. In 
Causatives and transitivity. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 
Hohenstein, J., Naigles, L., & Eisenberg, A. (2004) Keeping verb acquisition in motion: A 
comparison of English and Spanish. In G. Hall & S. Waxman (Eds.) Weaving a lexicon 
(pp. 569-602). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Kako, E. (2006). The semantics of syntactic frames. Language and Cognitive Processes, 21(5), 
562 – 575. 
Kako, E. T., & Wagner, L. (2001). The semantics of syntactic structures. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 5(3), 102–108. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01594-1 
Landau, B., & Gleitman, L. (1985). Language and experience: Evidence from the blind child. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Leslie, A. M. (1984). Spatiotemporal continuity and the perception of causality in infants. 
Perception, 13, 287–305. 
Leslie, A. M., & Keeble, S. (1987). Do six-month-old infants perceive causality? Cognition, 
25(3), 265–288. doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(87)80006-9 
Levin, B., & Rappaport Hovav, M. (2005). Argument realization. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 52	
Lidz, J., Gleitman, H., & Gleitman, L. (2003). Understanding how input matters: verb learning 
and the footprint of universal grammar. Cognition, 87(3), 151–178. doi:10.1016/S0010-
0277(02)00230-5 
Luo, Y., Kaufman, L., & Baillargeon, R. (2009). Young infants’ reasoning about physical events 
involving inert and self-propelled objects. Cognitive Psychology, 58(4), 441–486. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2008.11.001 
Markman, E. (1992). Constraints on word learning: speculations about their nature, origins and 
domain speciﬁcity. In M. R. Grunnar & M. Maratsos (Eds.), Modularity and constraints 
in language and cognition: the Minnesota Symposium on Child Psychology. HIllsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Michotte, A. (1963). The Perception of Causality. 
Montague, R. (1970). Universal grammar. Theoria, 36(3), 373–398. doi:10.1111/j.1755-
2567.1970.tb00434.x 
Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants’ causal representations of state change events. 
Cognitive Psychology, 61(2), 63–86. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.02.001 
Naigles, L. (1990). Children use syntax to learn verb meanings. Journal of Child Language, 
17(02), 357–374. doi:10.1017/S0305000900013817 
Naigles, L. (1996). The use of multiple frames in verb learning via syntactic bootstrapping. 
Cognition, 58, 221–251. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00681-8 
Naigles, L. (1998). Developmental changes in the use of structure in verb learning. In C. Rovee-
Collier, L. Lipsitt, & H. Haynes (Eds.), Advances in infancy research (Vol. 12, pp. 298–
318). London: Ablex. 
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 53	
Naigles, L., & Kako, E. (1993). First Contact in Verb Acquisition: Defining a Role for Syntax. 
Child Development, 64(6), 1665. 
Nazzi, T., & Gopnik, A. (2000). A shift in children’s use of perceptual and causal cues to 
categorization. Developmental Science, 3(4), 389–396. doi:10.1111/1467-7687.00133 
Nazzi, T., & Gopnik, A. (2001). Linguistic and cognitive abilities in infancy: when does 
language become a tool for categorization? Cognition, 80(3), B11–20. 
Pesetsky, D. (1995). Zero Syntax: Experiencers and Cascades. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pinker, S. (1984). Language learnability and language development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Pinker, S. (1989). Learnability and Cognition: The acquisition of Argument Structure. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Rappaport Hovav, M., & Levin, B. (1998). Building verb meanings. In The projection of 
arguments: Lexical and compositional factors (pp. 97–134). Stanford, CA: Center for the 
Study of Language and Information. 
Saxe, R., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Carey, S. (2005). Secret agents: Inferences about hidden causes 
by 10- and 12-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 16(12), 995–1001. 
Schulz, L. E., Standing, H. R., & Bonawitz, E. B. (2008). Word, thought, and deed: The role of 
object categories in children’s inductive inferences and exploratory play. Developmental 
Psychology, 44(5), 1266–1276. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.44.5.1266 
Scott, R. M., & Fisher, C. (2009). Two-year-olds use distributional cues to interpret transitivity-
alternating verbs. Language and Cognitive Processes, 24(6), 777 – 803. 
Snedeker, J., & Gleitman, L. R. (2004). Why it is hard to label our concepts. In S. R. Waxman & 
Hall (Eds.), Weaving a Lexicon (pp. 257–293). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 54	
Sobel, D. M., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gopnik, A. (2004). Children’s causal inferences from indirect 
evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers. Cognitive 
Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 28(3), 303–333. 
Spelke, E. S. (1990). Principles of object perception. Cognitive Science, 14, 29–56. 
Talmy, L. (1988). Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science, 12(1), 49–100. 
doi:10.1016/0364-0213(88)90008-0 
Tomasello, M. (1992). The social bases of language acquisition. Social Development, 1(1), 67–
87. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00135.x 
Van Valin, R. D., & LaPolla, R. J. (1997). Syntax: Structure, Meaning, and Function. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wagner, L. (2010). Inferring meaning from syntactic structures in acquisition: The case of 
transitivity and telicity. Language and Cognitive Processes, 25(10), 1354–1379. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/01690960903488375 
Wolff, P. (2008). Dynamics and the perception of causal events. In T. Shipley & J. Zacks (Eds.), 
Understanding events: How humans see, represent, and act on events (pp. 555–587). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Woodward, A. L. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor’s reach. 
Cognition, 69, 1–34. 
Xu, F., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). Word learning as Bayesian inference. Psychological Review, 
114, 245–272. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.114.2.245 
Yuan, S., & Fisher, C. (2009). “Really? She blicked the baby?”: Two-year-olds learn 
combinatorial facts about verbs by listening. Psychological Science, 20, 619–626. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02341.x 
LINKING	LANGUAGE	AND	EVENTS	 55	
Yuan, Sylvia, Fisher, C., & Snedeker, J. (2012). Counting the nouns: Simple structural cues to 
verb meaning. Child Development, 83, 1382–1399. 
Zacks, J. M. (2010). The brain’s cutting-room floor: segmentation of narrative cinema. Frontiers 
in Human Neuroscience, 4. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00168 	
